

Abstracts – Résumés
Concordia University — May 30 to June 2, 2010
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Alford-Duguid, Dominic (Toronto) – *Knowledge, Intuition, and Propriety*

In a recent paper, John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley defend the Reason-Knowledge Principle: roughly, a subject should treat a proposition *p* as a reason for action if and only if the subject knows that *p*. In this paper I assess the defensibility of this principle in light of recent objections levelled by Jessica Brown. I use Brown's objections to articulate several deep problems that face Hawthorne and Stanley's project.

Alward, Peter (Lethbridge) – *Make-Believe and the Urbane Backwoodsman*

Like the more familiar naïve backwoodsman, the urbane backwoodsman – because of his unfamiliarity with the conventions of theatre – erroneously believes an actor onstage to be in genuine danger. Unlike his naïve cousin, however, he realizes that there is nothing he can do to intervene, and despairs at his impotence. In this paper, I argue that make-believe models of fictional engagement entail that appreciators of fiction imagine being urbane backwoodsmen, but that in fact appreciators do not imagine desiring to intervene in fictional events nor being frustrated by their inability to do so.

Andreou, Chrisoula (Utah) – *Self-Defeating Self-Governance*

Certain platitudes concerning self-governance give rise to what seems to be a dilemma that suggests that informed self-defeating behaviour is impossible. I resolve this dilemma, showing that informed self-defeating behaviour can take the form of self-defeating self-governance. I end with some remarks concerning self-governance, self-defeat, and dynamic choice, and suggest that diachronic rationality constraints on agents can be derived from an understanding of self-defeating behaviour.

Bader, Daniel (Toronto) – *A Platonic Approach to the Therapeutic Misconception*

Franklin Miller and Howard Brody argue that medical research and medicine are different activities, and that they therefore ought to have separate ethics. To this argument, I apply the different kinds of relationships between crafts or "technai" in Plato's dialogues to show that, though they are different activities, they are related in such a way that the physicians involved in medical research are functioning qua physicians, not qua researchers. Therefore, though Miller and Brody are correct that medical research and medicine are different activities, medical research ethics cannot be separated from medical ethics.

Baumgaertner, Bert (California – Davis) – *Adaptive Concepts: Using Frames to Solve a Problem of Vagueness*

This paper explains why the inductive step in a sorites paradox seems psychologically compelling. The main thesis is that some concepts are adaptive, which means that scrutinizing cases near the boundaries can shift them. Consequently, even if concepts have sharp cutoffs, their mobility prevents us from locating them beyond a degree of precision.

Beauchair, Alain (Central Washington) – *That's Only Your Opinion!*

This paper offers a way of dealing with the refusal to engage in moral inquiry that is rooted in the claim "that's only your opinion." I object to any manner of combating this claim that transforms ethics into some abstract, objective enterprise. As an example I examine the popular tendency to open a course on ethics by challenging relativism. In response, I argue that we ought to clarify the character of choice to our students, and attempt to distinguish a moral judgment wherein one takes ownership over one's actions from a moral judgment that simply rationalizes pre-given ends.

Bergeron, Vincent (Ottawa) & Stokes, Dustin (Toronto) – *A Dilemma for Modular Architectures of the Mind*

We propose a dilemma for modularity architectures. First, if a modularity theory commits to the *informational encapsulation* of modules, then modules are on this account impenetrable. However, there are plausible cases of the cognitive penetrability of perception. And so any such theory fails. Second, many recent massive modularity theories weaken the strength of the notion of module. These theories avoid the incompatibility with cognitive penetrability. However, the weakened commitment to informational encapsulation significantly weakens the explanatory force of the theory and, ultimately, is conceptually incompatible with the core of modularity.

Biondi, Paolo (Sudbury / Laurentian) – *Aristotle on Imagination*

This paper examines Aristotle's account of imagination (*phantasia*). The main contention is that Nussbaum's account of *phantasia* can be improved by distinguishing a passive mode and an active mode of the activity of imagination. Passive imagination refers to the activation of *phantasia* by perceptible things stimulating the external senses of the percipient subject; active imagination refers to the activation of *phantasia* by the percipient subject itself. Furthermore, the passive mode's function of retention of appearances serves the active mode's function of interpretation.

Black, Sam (SFU) – *Why Kantian Contractualism Does not Explain Morality's Authority*

A recent history of foundational theories in ethics might be summed up as 'All hail the Kantian contractarians'. Kantian contractarian theories have recently been put forward by Gibbard, Darwall, Parfit and Scanlon. Scanlon presents the most developed argument for that position claiming that it provides the best account of morality's authority. I try to explain why he is mistaken.

Blackwood, Stephen (WLU) – Expressivism, Self-Knowledge, and Critical Rationality

On one reading of Wittgenstein (Jacobsen, 1996), authoritative self-ascription of one's present-tense mental states is explained by the fact that sincere self-ascriptions express the very states they self-ascribe. In contrast, others (e.g., Shoemaker, Burge, Bilgrami) have argued that self-ascriptions express a form of higher-order knowledge whose special character is explained by the role that knowledge plays in rationality. I argue that this account faces difficulties that both undermine it and reinforce the Wittgensteinian explanation.

Blomfield, Megan (Toronto) – Computer Experiments, Similarity and External Validity

This paper explores Wendy Parker's characterisation of computer simulation studies as experiments on real, physical systems. I discuss the external validity of traditional experiments and computer experiments and argue that the latter are not at an epistemic disadvantage due to the lack of material similarity between the experimental and target systems. In both cases, experimental inferences are justified when properties of interest in the experimental and target systems can be described using the same model.

Bondy, Patrick (McMaster) – Intensionality and Epistemic Justification

In this paper, I raise an objection to externalist reliabilism in epistemology that has not appeared in the literature to date. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional (with-an-s), and externalist reliabilism cannot accommodate that fact. I conclude that externalist reliabilism justifies too much, so it is not sufficient for epistemic justification.

Borgida, Michael (UWO) – Beyond our Grasp — Distance in Berkeley's Philosophy

In this paper I explore the relationship between tactile sensation and distance perception in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision and in his philosophy more generally. I argue against the accepted interpretation of Berkeley, articulated best by Margaret Atherton, that we perceive distance immediately by touch. I propose an alternative reading of Berkeley's remarks about distance and touch and argue that it aligns with Berkeley's philosophical commitments better than the accepted interpretation.

Brownlee, Timothy (Xavier) – Hegel's Defence of Toleration

In this paper, I argue that Hegel's defence of toleration should count as liberal. I show that Hegel justifies the demand for state non-interference in religious matters by appealing to specific "subjective rights" which are to protect individuals in the pursuit of their reflectively determined moral and religious interests. While I demonstrate that Hegel's argument for toleration most closely resembles Locke's, I conclude by stressing that, in spite of similarities between the rights-based accounts of toleration offered by Hegel, Locke, and contemporary figures like Rawls, Hegel's account is importantly different because of the non-contractualist idea of right at its basis.

Buenting, Joel (Alberta) – Summary Justice

Suppose I assault a person. Suppose I assault a person because this person is wearing a blue shirt. That's a bad reason to assault a person. But suppose I assault a person because this person sexually assaults a woman. Is that a good reason to assault a person? Let's call this an act of summary justice. Is it ever morally permissible to perform an act of summary justice? While the suggestion may seem disquieting, my intuition and the intuition of my informants is that acts of summary justice do not merit unequivocal moral condemnation. We sometimes have compelling reasons to act contrary to morality and sometimes those reasons are worthy of moral admiration. In this paper I explore this judgment.

Calcagno, Antonio (UWO – Kings' University College) – Conceiving the Political: Edith Stein's Phenomenology of the State

Edith Stein's *Über den Staat* takes up themes developed earlier in her phenomenology, but it also stands in a very different relation to her earlier work. This paper argues that Stein's text must not be read merely as a mundane phenomenology of the state extending her earlier analysis of community, but as a outlining a concept of the political. The political for Stein is distinguishable from the social and has its own proper regional ontology.

Caplan, Ben and Tillman, Chris and Reeder, Patrick (Ohio State) – Parts of Singletons

We present a view according to which members of singleton sets are parts of those sets: the mereological difference between a thing and its singleton is the empty set. This requires non-classical mereology. We present Kit Fine's non-classical mereology and show how it can accommodate our view of singletons and their parts. Finally, we display the virtues of our view over those of David Lewis's rival view according to which singletons are mereological atoms.

Chow, Sheldon (UWO) – The Frame Problem, Heuristics, and a New Problem for Abduction

In this paper, I elucidate computational and epistemological aspects of the frame problem. I then show how an appeal to certain heuristics to relieve the computational worries has drastic implications for the epistemological problem. Specifically, I illustrate that the appeal to heuristics introduces further computational problems. I then proceed to show that these further problems imply a new epistemological difficulty for solving the frame problem, namely a new problem for abduction.

Coughlin, Sean (UWO) – *Philoponus' Bright Idea*

It has been argued that Philoponus develops a dynamic theory of light based on his theory of impetus. Such a theory would represent the first time the laws of geometrical optics were given a physical basis and a step towards a unified theory of dynamics. I argue that Philoponus did not develop any such theory; rather, Philoponus maintains Aristotelian assumptions about the directionality of light, and lacks any physical theory that might account for it.

Cowling, Sam (Massachusetts –Amherst) – *Kant on Simple Substance*

In the Second Antinomy, Kant offers two arguments intended to establish mutually inconsistent conclusions about the mereological structure of reality. In this paper, I examine the Thesis argument and some of the interpretive challenges it presents. After addressing the historical precedents for the Thesis Argument—arguments offered by both Leibniz and the pre-Critical Kant—I argue that the Thesis Argument, which purports to establish that the world is ultimately composed of simples, relies upon a distinctively Leibnizian metaphysics of composition.

Cuffaro, Michael (UWO) – *How Should We Set the Social Minimum?*

Rawls's conception of justice is defended against an alternative conception of justice (Restricted Utilitarianism) in which equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity are affirmed but the difference principle is replaced with the principle of average utility and a social minimum below which no representative member of society is allowed to fall. I argue that Restricted Utilitarianism is unstable, and that as a conception it is inconsistent in practice.

Curry, Paul (Ottawa) – *Defending Virtue: A Reply to the Situationist Critique*

Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently taken evidence from the social sciences and turned it on virtue ethics, claiming that the moral theory rides on a popular misconception of durable, robust character traits, a view thoroughly debunked, they claim, by a wealth of empirical studies. This critique is misleading, I contend, because it rests on a combination of a misunderstanding of virtue ethics and an over-extrapolation of the empirical evidence.

DeRoo, Neal (Brock) – *What Can Phenomenology Teach Us about Oppression?*

Drawing from several sources in phenomenology, this paper seeks to provide a vocabulary that could be useful in explaining institutional oppression to those resistant to the idea that we can be responsible for acts that we do not intend. The paper's main goal is to justify the use of the terminology of passive synthesis in the discourse on oppression; however, it also suggests that employing passive synthesis in this manner may help combat oppression.

DeVidi, David (Waterloo) – *Mathematical Pluralism, Abstraction and Translation*

Mathematical pluralism is a hard notion to even make sense of. It faces the same conceptual challenges as others sorts of scientific pluralism, plus some extras due to the supposed certainty and indefeasibility of mathematical knowledge. This paper begins by considering some of the conceptual issues involved, and presents a little-known version of mathematical pluralism currently being advanced by a school of Italian constructivists, led by Giovanni Sambin, as a best candidate for meeting the conceptual difficulties. The paper then raises key problems that confront this approach and some possible lines of response, concluding that the view is one that deserves serious attention from philosophers of mathematics.

Dimitriu, Cristian (Toronto) – *Human Rights and Development as Fair Background Conditions of International Trade*

According to a common view in global justice, trade with developing countries is unfair if it fails to fulfill the right to a decent standard of living of citizens in poor countries. I argue that this view is misleading. Interrupting or failing to trade with poor nations may harm them but not wrong them, as there is not a duty to trade with others in the first place. International trade is unfair, then, for very different reasons.

Dixon, Nicholas (Alma College) – *Can We Romantically Love More than One Person at the Same Time?*

This paper examines three grounds for the exclusivity of romantic love. First, love is aimed at the beloved's uniqueness, rather than general qualities. Second, if love involves shared identity it necessarily precludes having more than one partner. Third, love's unique emotional benefits are best explained by its exclusivity. I argue that the first and third features of love are consistent with loving more than one person, whereas the second alleged feature, shared identity, does not arise in love.

Dorter, Kenneth (Guelph) – *Sense Perception and Reason in Parmenides*

Parmenides' interest in logic is not the kind of interest shown by Aristotle and the subsequent philosophical tradition. For them its power is primarily to extend knowledge of the temporal world beyond what our senses tell us, but Parmenides uses it not to extend our knowledge of the perceptual world, but to abstract from that world altogether: its function is intensive rather than extensive. Parmenides' much-disputed realm of appearance isn't tantamount to non-being, as is often assumed, but is the world given by the senses, in opposition to that presented by reason, a difference that is related to the presence or absence of time.

Dubreuil, Benoît (UQAM) – *Jesse Prinz on Moral Objectivity and Motivational Internalism*

Jesse Prinz (2007) proposes a sensibility theory of morality that includes a defence of *motivational internalism*, as well as a critique of *moral objectivism*. In the talk, I compare the arguments offered by Prinz in favour of motivational internalism to those that he proposes against moral objectivism. I aim at showing that Prinz is much more demanding in his criticism of objectivism than he is in his defence of internalism, and that he could well argue for the opposite theses if he shifted the burden of proof.

Jesse Prinz (2007) défend une théorie morale de la sensibilité s'accompagnant d'une défense de l'internalisme motivationnel, de même que d'une critique de l'objectivisme moral. Dans cet article, je compare les arguments de Prinz en faveur de l'internalisme motivationnel à ceux qu'il offre pour contrer l'objectivisme moral. J'entends montrer que Prinz est beaucoup plus exigeant dans sa critique de l'objectivisme que dans sa défense de l'internalisme et qu'il pourrait défendre les thèses opposées s'il renversait le fardeau de la preuve.

Ellefsen, Olaf (York) – *Does Cognitive Diversity Threaten Davidson's Argument against the Possibility of Conceptual Schemes?*

Stich alleges that the folk's cognitive diversity empirically falsifies Davidson's argument against the possibility of conceptual schemes by attacking the heart of Davidson's philosophy, his truth-theoretic semantics. Stich criticizes the connection between truth and translation as our intuitive understanding of T-sentences is simply one among many ways of understanding truth. I argue that the cognitive diversity Stich reveals is of no threat to Davidson and his argument against conceptual schemes remains untouched.

Freeman, Lauren (Duquesne) – *Reconsidering Relational Autonomy: A Feminist Approach to Selfhood and the Other in the Thinking of Martin Heidegger*

This paper examines a convergence between Heidegger's reconceptualization of "subjectivity" and "intersubjectivity" and some recent work in feminist philosophy on relational autonomy. It argues that Heidegger's notion of authentic *Mitsein* (being-with) rejects traditional notions of autonomy in favour of an intersubjective and relational understanding of selfhood. Ultimately, the paper provides a new point of entry into contemporary debates within feminist philosophy on Heidegger's thinking and defends Heidegger from certain feminist critiques.

Furlong, Matthew (Guelph) – *Foucault's Historiography: The Logic of Historical Events*

In this paper I try to articulate the importance of the concept "event" for Foucault's approach to considering history. I compare and contrast his work with that of Fernand Braudel, an historian of the Annales school whom Foucault admires, in order to show that for Foucault, history involves a non-durational temporal order that guarantees the singularity of historical phenomena, which is pivotal for Foucault's idea of critique.

Guarini, Marcello (Windsor) – *Particularism and Generalism: Rules, Cases, and Learning*

In the debate between moral particularists and generalists, empirical assumptions about learning are at work. Following up on a suggestion by Jonathan Dancy, this paper makes use of computational neural modeling to explore learning from cases. Neither pure forms of particularism nor pure forms of generalism are vindicated. Some of the underexplored middle ground between the more thoroughgoing forms of these positions is examined.

Habib, Allen (Calgary) – *Authority Interest and Promissory Obligation*

David Owens' novel theory of promissory obligations grounds them in the 'authority interest' of the promisee, i.e. the interest that the promisee has in being 'in control' of the promisor. Owens is right to appeal to authority interest as the source of the obligation to keep a promise, but I argue here that it is the authority interest of the promisor, not the promisee, that most plausibly grounds promissory obligations.

Hejazi, Omid (Queen's) – *What Do Egalitarians Get Wrong?*

This paper raises some doubt about two common methods that most of the egalitarian redistribution schemes employ: aiming at adult citizens as the primary target of egalitarian redistribution and following the income-tax model as the preferred model of redistribution. It will be argued that this method encounters many problems and difficulties including the "hard problem". Instead, I would like to show that we could come up with an alternative and more sensible scheme by (1) targeting the next generation in our redistribution policies, and (2) by employing capability approach, rather than resource-based compensation, which is borrowed from Amartya Sen.

Hey, Spencer and Weijer, Charles (UWO – Joseph L. Rotman Inst.) *The Assay Sensitivity Problem*

This paper examines the concept of "assay sensitivity" in clinical research. Defined as the ability of a clinical trial to distinguish between an effective and ineffective treatment, the need for assay sensitivity has been taken to support claims for the epistemic superiority of placebos over active control treatments. The demands of good clinical science, it is argued, must trump the physician's ethical duty to provide all trial participants with competent medical care. After analyzing this argument, we find that it rests on a conflation between what an experiment can demonstrate in principle and what it demonstrates in fact.

Hoffmann, Glen (Ryerson) – *Synthetic A Priori Infallibility*

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified to a degree that is truth entailing and falsity precluding. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism. Focusing on what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I argue against the possibility of the infallible a priori justification of so-called self justifying propositions.

Ionescu, Cristina (The Catholic University of America) – *Dialectical Method in the Timaeus*

This paper argues that, from underneath its mythical dress, Plato's *Timaeus* implicitly invites us to employ a dialectical method very much akin to the one developed explicitly in the *Philebus*. By depicting the Demiurge's creative activity of ordering reality by kinds, the *Timaeus* invites us to imitate and follow the Demiurgic activity through a dialectical method of collecting and dividing things in accordance with the natural joints of reality. This method enables us to advance from opinions to knowledge and from becoming to Being, respectively.

Isenberg, Jillian (UBC) and Matravers, Derek (The Open University) – *Fiction, Action and Belief*

This paper develops some thoughts first put forward by Kendall Walton in *Mimesis as Make-Believe*. These thoughts have been largely misunderstood, occasionally even by Walton himself. The claim is that the theory of fiction, as currently practised, is largely erroneous. The major philosophical problems are to do with narratives – whether fiction or non-fiction – and what problems there are specific to fiction can be sorted out once the problems with narrative have been solved.

Jimenez, Marta (Toronto) – *Aristotle on Learning Virtue by Doing Virtuous Actions*

Aristotle famously claims that we acquire virtue by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? Most commentators presume that Aristotle's solution to this puzzle rests upon a distinction between genuinely virtuous actions and actions that merely resemble virtuous actions. In this paper I argue against this standard interpretation and I offer an alternative account of Aristotle's solution.

Johnston, Joshua (UBC) – *Might the Artist's Freedom Matter to Art Appreciation?*

The intuition I wish to explore in this paper is that the artist's freedom is relevant to aesthetic appreciation. No doubt some (the "separatists") believe this intuition is irrelevant to appreciation, but the separatist view so far defended ultimately relies on an empiricist ontology of art. In order to make sense of the intuition a different ontology is needed, an ontology that takes artworks to be process-like instead of product-like entities.

Kao, Molly (UWO) – *Why de Broglie-Bohm Theory is not Everettian*

Brown & Wallace have argued that de Broglie-Bohm theory is actually an Everettian theory of quantum mechanics, on the grounds that the particles posited in the former are dispensable in its physical interpretation. I argue that this is not correct, and that they are led to this position by their theoretical commitments on how a theory represents physical reality. I then provide an alternative account of the role of the wavefunction in de Broglie-Bohm theory.

Kaposy, Chris (MUN) – *New Prenatal Testing Technology and the Expressivist Objection*

A medical diagnostic manufacturer named Sequenom Inc. is currently developing a new prenatal genetic test for genetic abnormalities like Down syndrome. According to the expressivist objection, prenatal testing and selective abortion are morally unsound because they send negative messages about living with disabilities. I argue that by putting a new test for Down syndrome on the market, Sequenom will participate in the depiction of Down syndrome as something to be feared or avoided.

Kochan, Jeff (Basel) – *Rouse on Science and Realism*

Joseph Rouse's "practical hermeneutics of science" has played an influential role in the "practice turn" in the philosophy of science. In this paper, I critically assess Rouse's claim that his practical hermeneutics overcomes the realism-antirealism dialectic. I argue that his attempt to assimilate metaphysics to semantics fails, and that he tacitly affirms the minimal realist doctrine of independent existence. Rouse is a realist after all, though perhaps a somewhat confused one.

Kumar, Victor (Arizona) – *Does the Evidence from Psychopathy Support Internalism?*

Empirical evidence suggests that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments. Might internalism be confirmed because it best explains psychopaths' moral impairment? Abductive arguments from psychopathy to internalism are not persuasive since a no less promising explanation for psychopaths' deficiency is externalist. Psychopaths tend not to make moral judgments because they lack the affective mechanisms present in normal humans that produce automatic moral evaluation. Situations that are morally loaded for normal people tend to elicit in psychopaths self-interested reasoning about the moral beliefs held by others. In short, psychopaths can make moral judgments, but often they do not.

Kumar, Victor (Arizona) – *'Knowledge' as a Natural Kind Term*

That 'knowledge' should behave like a natural kind term—never mind whether knowledge is a natural kind—may seem incompatible with core commitments in epistemology concerning scepticism. If 'knowledge' refers directly, knowledge is guaranteed so long as reference succeeds. However, it is a conceptual possibility that mental states related to 'knowledge' by acts of ostensive definition are not genuine cases of knowledge. So, 'knowledge' does not behave like a natural kind term *and could not* on pain of disregarding the plain possibility of scepticism—however remote. I defend the view that 'knowledge' is a natural kind term from the objection.

Lawson, Brian (Queen's) – *Reparations and the Chain of Collective Responsibility*

One cannot demand reparations for certain types of historical injustices if those who perpetrated the injustices have died. However, some argue that collectives, such as states, can be held to account for historical injustices because they persist through time and changes in membership. In this paper I argue that the blameworthiness of these collectives does not persist over time, and that present-day collectives and their members thereby cannot be regarded as blameworthy for historical injustices.

Lepock, Christopher (Toronto) – *Epistemic Exculpation*

Our intuition about brains in vats or evil demon victims is that they are exactly as justified as we are. This is often taken to show that there is a sense of epistemic justification that does not require that one's beliefs be reliable. Here, I offer an alternative explanation of this intuition. Under the right circumstances, agents who believe unreliably are exculpated from blame for their unreliability, and we lower the standards by which we evaluate their abilities. I propose an account of how such exculpations work.

Macdonald, Iain (Montréal) – *On the "Undialectical": Normativity in Hegel*

This paper discusses the normative character of Hegel's dialectic from a critical perspective. In particular, I examine the dialectic in terms of the development of internal normative constraints made explicit by individual consciousness. But contrary to Hegel's emphasis on dialectical negation (the so-called "negation of the negation"), I emphasize the moment that both prompts and threatens this movement, which I call the 'undialectical' moment of the dialectic.

MacIntosh, Rebecca (UWO) – *Niche Construction and Social Behaviours*

Niche constructionists have argued that humans, through the development of cultural traits within certain populations, have had far greater influence over their own evolution than any other organism. Such theories have failed, however, to consider the important role of intra-cultural social niches and their effect on individual fitness levels within cultural groups. The creation and maintenance of social environments is an evolutionary process unique to humans that greatly affects individual success within groups.

Mackay, John (Princeton) – *Conditionals, Mood and Binding*

Although conditionals are standardly divided into indicative and subjunctive, a phrase of one mood is sometimes embedded within a conditional of another mood. These conditionals challenge Lewis and Stalnaker's standard theory of subjunctive conditionals. After summarizing the challenges, I outline a semantics for these conditionals in terms of the binding of variables that range over possible worlds. I conclude with some implications for the broader study of modality and of conditionals.

Majithia, Roopen (Mount Allison) – *Virtue and the Law*

Critics think that on Aristotle's virtue-centric view we cannot adjudicate moral disagreements that are bound to arise in the life of a community, since we tend to think that the arbiter of such disagreements should be rule-governed, whereas it seems for Aristotle that the final authority on right action is the good person. But Aristotle does think there is a place for principles and rules in the moral realm, even in a virtue-centric ethic, and yet ultimately shows that there is perhaps too high a cost associated with rule-bound universalist theories.

Malinowski-Charles, Syliane (Bishop's) – *Fidéisme, rationalisme, ou libre pensée? Le Grand Siècle au tribunal des Lumières naissantes dans la correspondance entre Lamy et Saint-Laurens*

De 1708 à 1710, le cartésien François Lamy échange avec un lecteur de ses œuvres une correspondance sur la possibilité de la connaissance. Dans cette communication, je me propose de faire connaître ce document important qui vient d'être publié pour la première fois. À travers cet échange se joue la défense de la raison, mais plus encore, on peut dire que c'est toute la philosophie du Grand Siècle qui est au tribunal des Lumières naissantes. La découverte des arguments de Saint-Laurent montrera l'impuissance du rationalisme soutenu par Lamy contre ses attaques sceptiques, fidéistes et même libertines.

Marino, Patricia (Waterloo) – *Moral Coherence, Value Fragmentation, and Epistemic Justification*

I challenge a particular – and common – way of understanding moral coherence on which it is understood "richly," as involving norms of systematicity and unity, and in which the good of coherence is epistemic. I address the strategy of supporting rich coherence by drawing an analogy between scientific reasoning and moral reasoning; working with contemporary views of scientific coherence, I argue that this fails, partly because of the fragmented way we value.

Mathison, Eric (Calgary) – *Closed Minds and Open Futures: An Exploration of Liberalism and Child Rights*

A necessary trait of liberalism is that it allows persons to pursue their own conception of the good. Children have the right to future autonomy, because the development of that capacity is central to the pursuit liberalism wishes to promote. This paper assesses the scope of that child right by looking at examples in which it has been infringed, and also assesses some ways—namely, education—whereby the use of that right is encouraged.

Matravers, Derek (The Open University) and Isenberg, Jillian (UBC) – *Fiction, Action and Belief*

This paper develops some thoughts first put forward by Kendall Walton in *Mimesis as Make-Believe*. These thoughts have been largely misunderstood, occasionally even by Walton himself. The claim is that the theory of fiction, as currently practised, is largely erroneous. The major philosophical problems are to do with narratives – whether fiction or non-fiction – and what problems there are specific to fiction can be sorted out once the problems with narrative have been solved.

Mertel, Kurt (Northwestern) – *Blocking the Argument from Hallucination: The Phenomenological Disjunctivist Approach*

The challenge for disjunctivism posed by the Argument from Hallucination is to explain how two fundamentally different mental states can be subjectively indistinguishable without appealing to a shared content. The aim of this paper will be to address this challenge. I will argue that a hybrid account combining the disjunctivism of John McDowell with Alva Noe's phenomenological account of perception can provide a more compelling defence of Direct Realism than A.D. Smith's intentionalist approach.

Mertel, Kurt (Northwestern) – *Rescuing Kant from Non-conceptualist Kantianism*

The question of whether Kant was a nonconceptualist or conceptualist has given rise to a lively debate in the recent literature. In this paper, I will attempt to show that Robert Hanna's nonconceptualist reading is untenable by showing that the "twin pillars" of the nonconceptualist strategy fail to withstand critical scrutiny, viz., the strict separation of sensibility from the understanding and the assimilation of the imagination to sensibility.

Millar, Boyd (Toronto) – *Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism*

Philosophers such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson argue that while Russellian representationalism is incompatible with both the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion and the phenomenon of colour constancy, this is not true of Fregean representationalism. I argue that colour constancy poses a special problem for the Fregean theory in that the features of the theory that enable it handle spectrum inversion without illusion cannot be extended to handle colour constancy. Thompson's version of the Fregean theory is designed to solve this problem, but I argue that his proposed solution is ultimately unacceptable.

Moore, Dwayne (Wilfrid Laurier) – *Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination*

Jaegwon Kim argues that unreduced mental causes are excluded from efficacy because physical causes are sufficient in themselves. One response to this causal exclusion argument is to embrace overdetermination. The most promising form of overdetermination suggests that a physical event is necessary and sufficient for a given effect, but it necessitates a mental cause of the effect as well. I argue that if this mental cause is necessary, the physical cause cannot be individually sufficient.

Morris, David (Concordia) – *The Role of Place in Memory: A Merleau-Pontean Account*

This paper develops a phenomenological account of the way that memory extends into places beyond us. It does this by explicating Merleau-Ponty's account of memory in his lectures on passivity, focusing on his argument that memory involves a passivity that, however, complicates classical dualisms of activity and passivity. By studying the relation between passivity, habit, and the past, via background ontological issues of temporality and institution, the paper shows how place is involved in memory.

Norys, Marnina (York) – *Psychology and Phronesis: The Import of Findings in Psychology, Social Cognition and Neuroscience for Moral Wisdom*

In this paper I present current findings in psychology, social cognition and neuroscience to demonstrate how certain cognitive biases stand to skew moral perception. Not only will I argue that this research shows us how moral perception might go wrong, but I will also conclude that psychologists might also provide us with clues as to how to better achieve what Aristotle describes as 'phronesis' or moral wisdom.

Olson, Dustin (McMaster) – *Epistemic Robots and Doxastic Personalities*

Rational epistemic peer disagreement may be possible—an individual's evidential considerations can be fully rational, yet lead to a conclusion that opposes an epistemic peer's conclusion regarding the same evidence. Accepting that there are subjective elements in belief formation, however, leads to a problem: how much subjectivity in belief formation can we allow, while also holding some standard of objective rationality? This paper discusses these two issues.

Peacock, Kent (Lethbridge) – *Can Quantum Mechanics Unfreeze Time?*

Lee Smolin argues that a major factor blocking progress in physics is the spatialization of time. This paper explores the possibility that suitably designed Bell-Kochen-Specker experiments could undermine the treatment of spacetime as a four-dimensional geometric object. The plausibility of this view is argued for in light of trends in the development of quantum mechanics, and some of its more radical implications are explored.

Petropanagos, Angel (UWO) – *Pronatalism, Biologism and Oncofertility*

Oncofertility research is developing effective fertility preservation techniques for those diagnosed with cancer. Experimental technologies for preserving female fertility are considerable risky. Feminist frameworks that focus on the threat of pronatalism, cannot fully explain why some women might be compelled to choose oncofertility methods over other, less risky reproductive technologies. In this paper I suggest that biologism- a bias in having genetically related children- not pronatalism explains why some women may use oncofertility technologies.

Pourousefi, Sareh (Toronto) – *Hypocrisy and Conflicts of Interest*

I argue against the dominant understanding of hypocrisy as presented by Andrew Stark, and show that a theoretically nuanced understanding of the concept of hypocrisy helps us arrive at a more systematic treatment of conflicts of interest in politics. The moral culpability of a hypocrite depends on the role of harm, deception, intention, self-awareness, and self-interest in a given action, although all variations of hypocrisy are sometimes viewed as equally blameworthy in public discourse. This phenomenon poses a threat to the moral force of accusations of hypocrisy, and may even promote perverse incentives that encourage, instead of dissuade hypocritical behaviour.

Ray, Nicholas (UWO) – *Dennett's Problematic View of Counterfactuals*

I offer a critique of Dennett's neo-Humean view of causation, which grounds his semantics of counterfactuals. His contention that an epistemic account of necessary causation, together with a metaphysical account of sufficient causation, is untenable given our intuitions about the truth of simple causal statements. Because his semantical account of counterfactuals leads to serious problems on a more fundamental issue, the semantics of singular causal claims, I argue that we should reject his proposal.

Reeder, Patrick and Tillman, Chris and Caplan, Ben (Ohio State) – *Parts of Singletons*

We present a view according to which members of singleton sets are parts of those sets: the mereological difference between a thing and its singleton is the empty set. This requires non-classical mereology. We present Kit Fine's non-classical mereology and show how it can accommodate our view of singletons and their parts. Finally, we display the virtues of our view over those of David Lewis's rival view according to which singletons are mereological atoms.

Riggio, Adam (McMaster) – *A Deep Ecology Needs No Roots: The Small-Mindedness of the Humanist Critique*

The humanist critique of deep ecology, whose model figure is Luc Ferry, says that deep ecology is inevitably anti-democratic, because environmental reverence praises roots and tradition above freedom. This essay analyzes Ferry's critique as a continuation of his critique of Heidegger's philosophy of roots. While I agree with Ferry about the concept of roots, I describe a democratic deep ecology, which does not rely on rootedness as a central concept at all.

Rodier, Kristin (Alberta) – *Michael Smith's Moral Realism and the Desires of Fully Rational Agents*

In this paper I discuss the demandingness of the condition that the desires of fully rational agents converge in order for there to be normative, objective, and practical moral facts.

Rosner, Mark (Queen's) – *On the Irrationality of Akratic Action*

Recent debates concerning akratic action have questioned their traditional construal as a paradigm instance of irrationality. Drawing on cases of so-called 'inverse akrasia', it has been contended that akrasia can sometimes be a rational course of action in deliberating about what to do. In this paper I defend the traditional thought that akratic action is necessarily irrational against these new criticisms.

Ross, Andrew P. (Queen's) – *Valuing Rational Life: Vulnerability and the Moral Relationship*

In *Moral Dimensions*, T.M. Scanlon argues that blame is primarily concerned with the impairment of human relationships. This commits Scanlon to the view that we are in an ongoing "moral relationship" with all rational agents. R. Jay Wallace, in a forthcoming essay, argues that the moral relationship is a merely notional connection that cannot account for the particular way in which we focus on, and feel vulnerable to, the attitudes of immoral strangers. In response to Wallace, I argue that the contractualist understanding of justifiability can account for the shortcomings of a notional connection.

Samaroo, Ryan (Oxford) – *What is Background-independence?*

In the pursuit of an empirically adequate theory of quantum gravity, some approaches are thought to be more promising than others. Proponents of the canonical quantisation programme take background-independence—a characteristic of a physical theory that is free of geometrical structures that remain invariant under a symmetry transformation—to be the most promising research strategy. And, in the main, they identify background independence with some form of general covariance. I argue that this identification is insufficient.

Schollmeier, Paul (Nevada, Las Vegas) – *Comedy à la Aristotle*

My purpose to present what may quite likely be the Aristotelian concept of comic action and its catharsis. I shall draw a parallel between tragedy and comedy and show that tragic action and its catharsis rest on ethical presuppositions that can serve comic action and its catharsis. My contention is that a pitiable and fearful action and a ridiculous and shameful action can have a capacity to function in a manner surprisingly similar.

Shannon, Daniel (DePauw) – *The Continual Return of the Female Principle in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*

There has been much debate on how Hegel uses Sophocles' character Antigone as the representative of the "female principle" in the opening section of chapter six, "Spirit"; most considerations are narrowly focused and fail to address Hegel's concern with how natural law defined the "beautiful accord" of Greek society. They do not consider Antigone's role as "law tester" or the subsequent representatives of the female principle after Antigone's exit. The female representatives continually challenge the more traditional representations of natural law.

Shecaira, Fábio (McMaster) – *Legal Positivism and the Problem of Theoretical Disagreement*

One of Ronald Dworkin's arguments against legal positivism consists in an attempt to show that it cannot account for the phenomenon of theoretical disagreement in law. Legal officials, Dworkin contends, frequently disagree about which interpretive method to apply in the adjudication of legal disputes. I argue that Dworkin is right to believe that the pervasiveness of theoretical disagreement would pose a serious problem for positivism, but wrong to suppose that such disagreement is indeed pervasive.

Sikka, Sonia (Ottawa) – *Cultural Relativism and the Problem of Power*

This paper re-examines the debate about the cultural relativity of ethics, bringing anthropological and philosophical discourses into dialogue with one another. It argues in particular that both sides of the debate have failed to pay adequate attention to the issue of power-relations in the production of the so-called “moral codes” of societies, with the result that the terms in which the debate is presently formulated are seriously misleading. Greater critical focus on the concept of “culture” would help to correct this problem.

Smyth, Bryan (Memphis) – *Merleau-Ponty and Transcendental Philosophy*

Recent interest in first-person experience has generated proposals about incorporating phenomenology, in particular the early work of Merleau-Ponty, into the naturalistic framework of cognitive science. This paper argues that such attempts are misguided. For Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology represents a development – albeit a radical one – within, rather than a departure from, the tradition of transcendental philosophy, and as a consequence it remains opposed to strict philosophical naturalism in principle.

Stokes, Dustin (Toronto) & Bergeron, Vincent (Ottawa) – *A Dilemma for Modular Architectures of the Mind*

We propose a dilemma for modularity architectures. First, if a modularity theory commits to the *informational encapsulation* of modules, then modules are on this account impenetrable. However, there are plausible cases of the cognitive penetrability of perception. And so any such theory fails. Second, many recent massive modularity theories weaken the strength of the notion of module. These theories avoid the incompatibility with cognitive penetrability. However, the weakened commitment to informational encapsulation significantly weakens the explanatory force of the theory and, ultimately, is conceptually incompatible with the core of modularity.

Stumpf, Andrew (Waterloo) – *Harmonizing Leibniz's Ontology*

In this paper I outline a compatibilist interpretation of Leibniz’s views on corporeal substances which, I argue, is preferable to the dominant interpretations in the literature. I argue that Leibniz sees both monads and corporeal substances as ontologically basic (irreducibly real) entities, and that he does so in a way that is logically consistent. Leibniz accomplishes this by distinguishing two ways of being ontologically basic (one for monads, and the other for corporeal substances) in a way that parallels the two senses of “primary substance” applied by Aristotle to individual substances in the *Categories* and to their forms in *Metaphysics Z*.

Sullivan, Arthur (MUN) – *What do Deviant Logicians Show about the Epistemology of Logic?*

What I will call ‘the deviant logician objection’ is one line of attack against the common and compelling tenet that our knowledge of logical truths is grounded in our understanding of their constituent concepts. I will consider two versions of this objection – one suggested by Horwich (2000), the second developed by Williamson (2006). My thesis is that while the deviant logician falls short of proving that this traditional tenet is irredeemably flawed, nonetheless it serves to bolster some important refinements.

Tait, Morgan (UWO) – *Why I am not a Quantum Bayesian*

I argue that the quantum Bayesian (‘QBist’) subjective interpretation of the probabilities occurring in quantum mechanics is inadequate. The main positive argument in favour of QBism, the so-called ‘steering argument’, is examined and criticized. I also argue that despite appeals to various representation theorems, the QBist is unable to explain the intersubjective agreement within the physics community about quantum probabilities. An alternative objective chance interpretation of quantum mechanics is outlined. This interpretation is compatible with special relativity and capable of overcoming the explanatory deficits of quantum Bayesianism.

Tait, Morgan (UWO) – *Is Synthesis Psychologistic?*

Many commentators in the analytic tradition have accused Kant of illicit psychologism. One potential problem with psychologistic explanations is that they may confuse the context of discovery of truths with their justification. I argue that Kant’s arguments in the A and B-deductions, and the doctrine of synthesis on which they depend, involve no such confusion. Nevertheless, to completely avoid the psychologism charge, Kant must show that the formal intuitions that we do possess are the formal intuitions that any being endowed with sensible intuition must possess. He does not succeed in this latter task.

Thierman, Stephen (Toronto) – *Technologies of Power: Foucault Goes to a Slaughterhouse*

The work of Michel Foucault is not often considered in discussions about animal ethics, but many of his insights can be extended into this area of philosophical inquiry. In this paper, I present the slaughterhouse as a “technology of power” that is complicit in the objectification of both human and nonhuman animal subjects. I argue that a variety of hierarchies (spatial, racial, economic, species, etc.) dovetail to create an environment in which care and concern are virtually impossible. By coupling a Foucauldian analysis with insights developed in the bioethical work of Ralph Acampora, I am able to offer a novel normative critique of a problematic institution.

Thorp, John (UWO) – *Aristotelis Corruptus*

The syncretizing Neoplatonists took Aristotle on board their juggernaut; this led to the preservation of much of the Corpus. But before they could welcome him in, they had to defang his nominalist metaphysics. Plotinus accomplished this by seizing on a perceived incoherence respecting differentia: which category does it belong to, substance or quality? I argue that they were playing here with a corrupted version of the doctrine of categories; the true version escapes this criticism.

Tillman, Chris and Reeder, Patrick and Caplan, Ben (Ohio State) – *Parts of Singletons*

We present a view according to which members of singleton sets are parts of those sets: the mereological difference between a thing and its singleton is the empty set. This requires non-classical mereology. We present Kit Fine's non-classical mereology and show how it can accommodate our view of singletons and their parts. Finally, we display the virtues of our view over those of David Lewis's rival view according to which singletons are mereological atoms.

Tonkens, Ryan (York) – *A Vindication of the Precautionary Principle*

Recently, Holm & Harris (2002) have rejected the use of the Precautionary Principle for resolving bioethical issues. Here I outline a version of the Precautionary Principle that overcomes their criticisms. Once we have in place a better understanding of the nature of the contexts where the Precautionary Principle is appropriately appealed to and the different levels of decision-making where it may be called upon (among other things), Holm & Harris' objections fall by the wayside.

Viger, Chris (UWO) – *Maybe Concepts Don't Compose*

The constraint that concepts must compose is central in philosophical reasoning about concepts. I review the reasons for adopting the constraint and challenge it with two arguments for why concepts do not compose. I present a view, the acquired language of thought hypothesis (ALOT), which can account for the relevant phenomena without supposing that concepts compose. Since this is an alternative to Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, I conclude by responding to objections from LOT.

Von Kriegstein, Hasko (Toronto) – *Douven's Challenge*

Igor Douven suggested that epistemic justification might involve an element of explicit arbitrariness. I argue that, while it is very hard to show that an account of epistemic justification that involves such arbitrariness cannot, in principle be right, every such account will face considerable challenges. Douven's device (a solution to the lottery paradox) conflicts with various epistemic desiderata. Moreover it relies on an mistaken conception of the connection between our epistemic goal and practical interests.

Wayne, Andrew (Guelph) – *Explanation, Idealization and Successful Representation*

Explanation in physics relies on idealized models of physical systems, and the explanations themselves fail to satisfy the conditions of standard normative accounts of explanation. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that idealizations can be used to underwrite explanations, but only where these idealizations successfully represent the system. This paper contends that the link between successful representation and explanation should be broken, and it argues for an expanded role for explanatory idealizations.

Weijer, Charles and Hey, Spencer (UWO – Joseph L. Rotman Inst.) *The Assay Sensitivity Problem*

This paper examines the concept of "assay sensitivity" in clinical research. Defined as the ability of a clinical trial to distinguish between an effective and ineffective treatment, the need for assay sensitivity has been taken to support claims for the epistemic superiority of placebos over active control treatments. The demands of good clinical science, it is argued, must trump the physician's ethical duty to provide all trial participants with competent medical care. After analyzing this argument, we find that it rests on a conflation between what an experiment can demonstrate in principle and what it demonstrates in fact.

Yi, Byeong-Uk (Toronto at Mississauga) – *A New Case for Indeterminacy of Translation*

In this paper, I revisit W. V. Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation. I think Quine's arguments for the thesis are marred by his controversial assumptions about language that amount to a kind of linguistic behaviourism. I hope to cast a new light on the thesis by presenting a strong argument for the thesis that does not rest on those assumptions. The argument that I present in the paper results from adapting Benson Mates's objection to Rudolph Carnap's analysis of synonymy as intensional isomorphism.

Yi, Byeong-Uk (Toronto at Mississauga) – *Can we see numbers? Can we see sets?*

Kim and Maddy argue that we can see some sets of physical objects (e.g., a set of two eggs) because we can have numerical perceptions about physical objects (e.g., the eggs in a carton). This paper argues that numerical perception does not involve perception of sets, and conclude that we cannot see sets although there is some sense in which we can see the number of some physical objects.